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A tragedy of the commons (TOC) occurs when individuals acting in their own self-interest deplete
commonly-held resources, leading to a worse outcome than had they cooperated. Over time, the
depletion of resources can change incentives for subsequent actions. Here, we investigate long-
term feedback between game and environment across a continuum of incentives in an individual-
based framework. We identify payoff-dependent transition rules that lead to oscillatory TOC-s in
stochastic simulations and the mean field limit. Further extending the stochastic model, we find that
spatially explicit interactions can lead to emergent, localized dynamics, including the propagation of
cooperative wave fronts and cluster formation of both social context and resources. These dynamics
suggest new mechanisms underlying how TOCs arise and how they might be averted.
In 1968, Garrett Hardin explored a social dilemma,
which he termed the ‘Tragedy of the Commons’ (TOC)
[1]. The social dilemma arises when two individuals
choose amongst distinct strategies to utilize a limited
public good. Both individuals receive the maximal com-
bined benefit if they utilize the public good with re-
straint, i.e., if they ‘cooperate’. However, each individual
receives the maximal personal benefit if they utilize the
public good without restraint, i.e., if they ‘defect’, while
their opponent cooperates. As a consequence, individuals
acting rationally will cheat leaving all worse off. Hardin
argued that such a TOC is inevitable [1].
Evolutionary dynamics arising from a TOC dilemma
can be modeled in terms of changes in the frequencies
of individuals from two populations. Indivdiuals interact
and receive payoffs that depend on their strategy and the
strategy of their opponent. In replicator dynamics [2],
the payoff represents a relative fitness which determines
the growth of cooperators, with frequency x, and of de-
fectors, with frequency 1− x, i.e.,:
x˙ = x(1− x)(rC(x,A)− rD(x,A)). (1)
The values rC and rD denote the context-dependent
fitness payoff to cooperators and defectors respectively,
given the payoff matrix [3], A = [R ST P ], where rC =
Rx+S(1−x), rD = Tx+P (1−x) and where R denotes
the reward to cooperation, T denotes the temptation to
cheat, S denotes the sucker’s payoff, and P denotes the
punishment given mutual defection. A TOC occurs when
T > R, P > S, and P < R. However, in contrast to
standard game theory assumptions, payoffs are unlikely
to remain fixed after repeated decisions that degraded
commonly-held resources.
To address this issue, a recent model [4] considered
dynamics arising given resource-dependent payoff ma-
trices A(n) = A0(1 − n) + A1(n), which interpolate
between A0 and A1, the payoff matrices given deplete
and replete resource states, respectively, i.e., A(n) =[
R0 S0
T0 P0
]
(1−n)+ [R1 S1T1 P1 ]n. This model of coevolutionary
game dynamics included feedback with the environmen-
tal state denoted by 0 ≤ n ≤ 1, such that
x˙ = x(1− x) [rC(x,A(n))− rD(x,A(n))] , (2)
n˙ = n(1− n) (θx− (1− x)) . (3)
where  is a speed parameter and θ denotes the strength
of cooperators in restoring the environment. In this co-
evolutionary model, the payoff matrices A0 and A1 can
have markedly different Nash equilibria [5]. For exam-
ple, when defection is uniformly favored when n = 1 and
cooperation is favored when n = 0, then the the system
can exhibit a novel phenomenon termed an ‘oscillatory
tragedy of the commons’ (o-TOC). An o-TOC denotes
a trajectory in the phase plan that approaches a het-
eroclinic cycle. Given a replete environment, the pop-
ulation rapidly switches from cooperation to defection,
which then degrades the environment. In the depleted
environment, cooperators re-establish, improving the en-
vironment, then defectors invade and the cycle repeats.
Other outcomes, including a TOC and the aversion of a
TOC can emerge given other payoff matrices [4].
This coevolutionary game model is the basis for our
development and analysis of an individual-based frame-
work to assess the influence of noise (first) and spatially
explicit interactions (second) on the emergent dynam-
ics of social context and resources. To begin, consider a
system comprised of NC cooperators and ND defectors,
such that N = NC + ND. A single time step consists
of N events. In each event, a randomly chosen individ-
ual (the focal player) interacts with another individual
(the opponent) chosen at random. The payoff to the fo-
cal player influences its probability to reproduce. Criti-
cally in our proposed framework, successful reproduction
by the focal player replaces a randomly chosen third in-
dividual (see [6] for a related public goods model that
decouples interaction and reproduction). The following
reactions denote those transitions that lead to a change
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FIG. 1. Coevolutionary dynamics of strategies and resources in replicator and IBM dynamics. (a) The dynamics with IBM2, in which
offspring of the focal player replace the opponent. (b) The dynamics with IBM3, in which offspring of the focal player replaces a random
individual. In both panels, parameter space is divided according to the sign of R0−T0, S0−P0. In each section in the parameter space, a
phase diagram with different A0 in is shown, where the x-axis represents x and the y-axis denotes n. Light gray trajectories are mean field
solutions and black trajectories denote IBM dynamics where arrows denote the flow of time. Visualized IBM trajectories are the average
of 100 replicates with the same parameter set, except for oscillatory dynamics, given phase differences that can arise due to demographic
noise. Common parameters for all replicates: θ = 2,  = 0.5, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.05, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1]; A0 varies by region. Full parameter
list for A0 in FIG. S1.
in the number of cooperators or defectors:
focal︷︸︸︷
C +
opponent︷︸︸︷
C +
random
player︷︸︸︷
D
k1−→
focal︷︸︸︷
C +
opponent︷︸︸︷
C +
replaced︷︸︸︷
C
C + D + D
k2−→ C + D + C
D + C + C
k3−→ D + C + D
D + D + C
k4−→ D + D + D
(4)
where ki denote reproduction rates.
In the three-individual framework, the master equation
for the dynamics of cooperators is:
P (nC , τ + ∆τ) = P (nC , τ) + T(nC |nC − 1)P(nC − 1, τ)∆τ
+ T(nC |nC + 1)P(nC + 1, τ)∆τ
− T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC , τ)∆τ
− T(nC − 1|nC)P(nC , τ)∆τ +O(∆τ2),
(5)
where the transition rates are:
T(nC + 1|nC) = k1nC nC − 1
N − 1
nD
N − 1 + k2nC
nD
N − 1
nD
N − 1
T(nC − 1|nC) = k3nD nC
N − 1
nC
N − 1 + k4nD
nD − 1
N − 1
nC
N − 1 .
(6)
In the SI, we derive the expected mean field dynamics for
the frequency of cooperators x ≡ limN,nc→∞
(
nc
N
)
from
the master equation:
x˙ = x(1− x) [(k1 − k3)x+ (k2 − k4)(1− x)] . (7)
We recover the replicator dynamics of the coevolutionary
model when k1 = R(n), k2 = S(n), k3 = T (n), and k4 =
P (n). Hence, transition rates are a function of resource-
and social-context dependent payoffs. In contrast, mean
field dynamics derived via a two-player individual based
model formulation (IBM2) result in a logistic dependency
on x distinct from the cubic nonlinearity in Eq. 7 (see SI
for derivation and details).
In order to further evaluate stochastic dynamics of the
IBM formulation, we simulated the joint dynamics of re-
sources n and social context x using N = 104 individu-
als. A single time step over an interval ∆t includes N
game steps followed by changes in resource levels, n(t)
according to Eq. 3 (see Supplementary Information (SI)
for details). Given the master equation analysis, we de-
fine reproduction rates ki based on the current environ-
mental state n(t). Consistent with our finding from the
master equation, the simulation results of the individual-
based model involving three players (IBM3) recapitulate
predictions of the mean-field replicator dynamics model
(see FIG. 1-right). Specifically, we identify seven distinct
phases corresponding to the relative magnitude of payoffs
given the resource deplete state. The phases and their
asymptotic behavior agree qualitatively with mean-field
predictions. In contrast, if the focal player reproduces
and replaces the opponent (as is often assumed in two-
player variants of spatial games), then the individual-
based simulations diverge from predictions (see FIG. 1-
left) as anticipated from expected mean field dynamics
(see SI).
There are two notable quantitative differences in the
IBM3 simulations with respect to predictions from repli-
3cator dynamics. First, whereas mean-field dynamics pre-
dict convergence to a heteroclinic cycle (see ‘o-TOC’ re-
gion in FIG. 1-right), the IBM simulations stochastically
reach an absorbing state on the boundary. Such a result
is anticipated in any finite size simulation, given that
heteroclinic cycles asymptotically approach the bound-
ary. Second, the mean field model predicts closed period
orbits given certain symmetric properties of A0 and A1
(corresponding to the line with slope (T1−R1)/(P1−S1)
in FIG. 1-right.) In contrast, the IBM simulations have
demographic noise, which can lead to repeated oscilla-
tions and convergence to a boundary (see FIG. S3).
To study the combined effects of spatial structure and
demographic noise (see [7]) we extended the IBM3 frame-
work a 2-dimensional fully occupied lattice with L sites
per dimension given periodic boundary conditions, where
the N = L2 individuals are either cooperators or defec-
tors. The focal player is selected at random and oppo-
nent is chosen randomly from the von Neumann neigh-
borhood of the focal player. We denote the position of
the focal player (opponent) as ~rF (~rO). The focal player
reproduces with probability rate km(sF , sO, n¯) given the
strategy set of focal player and opponent, sF and sO, and
the average local environment, n¯ = (n(~rF ) + n(~rO))/2.
Environmental state dynamics n(~r, t) are augmented by
diffusion, i.e.,:
∂n
∂t
= n(1− n) (θx− (1− x)) +Dn∇2n. (8)
The diffusivity Dn controls the redistribution of resources
relative to population dynamics.
Simulations of coevolutionary game-environmental dy-
namics reveal dramatic changes in outcomes given spa-
tially explicit interactions. FIG. 2 compares dynamics of
non-spatial and spatial IBM models with three different
diffusivities, Dn = 0, 1,∞, classifying outcomes based
on whether there is a TOC or not (the latter we term
averted, see SI for criteria). The heat maps show the
proportion of averted cases among all replicates. Spa-
tial interactions enable TOC aversion when cooperation
is favored given a coordination game context (R0 > T0
and S0 < P0, see upper left). However, spatial interac-
tions also restrict the parameter regimes where a TOC
can be averted given an anti-coordination game context
(R0 < T0 and S0 > P0, see bottom right). For long-term
dynamics, we find that oscillating dynamics are typical in
Dn =∞ cases (see examples in the SI). Such oscillatory
dynamics can spiral inwards when TOC-s are averted or
outwards to the boundary. Of note, amongst IBM mod-
els we only observe a persistent o-TOC when Dn = ∞;
indicating the role of strong spatial coupling to induce
oscillations.
We further investigated spatiotemporal dynamics fo-
cusing on variation in Dn given parameter regimes with
both averted and TOC dynamics. These regimes corre-
spond to the case where S0 < P0, R0 > T0 and where
R0 > −θ(S0 − P0) + T0 (see bottom panels of FIG. 2).
The results of spatially explicit IBM3 model simulations
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FIG. 2. Strategy-resource dynamics given spatial interactions.
Colors in each heat-map denote the fraction of averted dynamics
out of 20 replicates with different A0’s. The horizontal axis of the
heat maps are S0−P0 and the vertical ones are R0−T0. Each grid
on the heat maps has increment 0.1. The diffusivity Dn is showed
in the title of each panel. Other parameters for all replicates are
L = 100, θ = 2,  = 0.5, ∆x = 1, and ∆t = 0.05, A1 = [3, 0; 5, 1].
The white lines mark out the boundary of different dynamics pre-
dicted by the mean field model. Full parameter list for A0 in each
regime are listed in FIG. S2.
are shown in FIG. 3 for Dn = 0, 1 and ∞. Notably, all
cases appear to exhibit clustering amongst cooperators
and the cases with heterogeneous environmental dynam-
cis (Dn = 0 and Dn = 1) also appear to exhibit clus-
tering between cooperators and environmental resource
state. However, there are markedly different types of
emergent spatial patterns give variation in the diffusiv-
ity of environmental resource state. In order to assess
clustering quantitatively, we analyzed the joint structure
of social context and resource levels by measuring the
spatial cross-correlation function:
gCN (r, t) =
L2
A(r)
Σi,j(Σi′,j′xi,j(t) · ni′,j′(t))
Σi,jxi,j(t)Σi,jni,j(t)
, (9)
and the spatial autocorrelation function of cooperator
clustering:
gCC(r, t) =
L2
A(r)
Σi,j(Σi′,j′xi,j(t) · xi′,j′(t))
(Σi,jxi,j(t))2
, (10)
where r <
√
(i− i′)2 + (j − j′)2 ≤ r + 1, and A(r) de-
notes the number of lattice sites within this range in both
cases. We then fit the short-range components of the ob-
served correlation at a fixed time point to a decaying ex-
ponential, i.e., g(r, t) ∼ 1+α(t)e−r/ξ(t) given pre-factor α
and correlation length ξ.We then fit the short-range com-
ponents of the observed correlation at a fixed time point
to a decaying exponential, i.e., g(r, t) ∼ 1 + α(t)e−r/ξ(t)
given pre-factor α and correlation length ξ. The spatial
autocorrelation analysis confirms the emergence of clus-
tering amongst cooperators when the TOC is averted,
4i.e., gCC(r) > 1 for r → 1 (see black lines in the sub-
panels of FIG. 3). Yet there are marked differences in
the dynamics of the cross-correlation between coopera-
tors and the environmental state.
For Dn = 0, the environment and cooperative pop-
ulation propagate outward as a wave. The cooperative
population spread leaving patches of resource replete en-
vironments. The gCN (r) plots shows that x and n can
be positively correlated as a wave initiates but nega-
tively correlated once defectors invade and replace re-
source replete environments, leading to (often disjoint)
patchy distributions of both resources and cooperators.
In contrast, for Dn = 1, small clusters of cooperators and
localized resources form after initial transient dynamics.
This feature is captured by the gCN (r) analysis, revealing
strongly elevated cross-correlation (see the middle row of
FIG. 3) as well as similar pattern in the dynamics of
gCC(r) and gCN (r). We note that these ‘gangs’ of co-
operators and their environmental ‘tail’ are chased by a
dominant group of defectors (see [8] for related findings
in evolutionary PD models withoout environmental feed-
back). Finally, given Dn =∞, the resources are uniform
across space. Cooperative clusters grow towards system
sizes due to the strong spatial coupling mediated via fast
resource diffusivity. The single large cooperator cluster
expands and shrinks over time with increasing amplitude,
as evidenced by the elevated autocorrelation of gCC(r) in
the bottom row of FIG. 3, with rapid switches in resource
state, leading to an eventual collapse of the cooperator
population. We do not report gCN (r) given the uniform
distribution of resources given Dn =∞.
In summary, we have developed an individual-based
framework to incorporate the analysis of demographic
noise and spatial interactions in coevolutionary game dy-
namics that coupled individual strategies and the envi-
ronment [7]. The IBM involving 3 players in a game
recapitulates and generalizes earlier findings from a co-
evolutionary game model, including the emergence of an
oscillatory tragedy of the commons. Spatial interactions
can shift the domains in which a tragedy of the com-
mons may arise when compared to non-spatial models
[9]. Spatially explicit dynamics also lead to novel, coher-
ent spatiotemporal patterns [10–14], including diffusive
clusters, flickering, and wave-like patterns. These joint
dynamics of resources and social strategies suggest mul-
tiple avenues for future study, including formally deriv-
ing effective PDEs to characterize whether the system
permits propagating waves in the large system limit. It
will also be critical to evaluate the extent to which spa-
tial interactions modify strategy-environment feedback
in proposed generalizations [15] of the replicator frame-
work underlying the present work [4] and in stochastic
games with feedback between behavior and public good
states [16]. Finally, the spatial approach may also aid ef-
forts to understand how microorganisms produce and uti-
lize public goods, e.g., siderophores – extracellular iron
harvesting enzymes [6, 17–20]. Given increasing pres-
sures on limited resources, we intend to leverage prior
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FIG. 3. Spatiotemporal dynamics of resources and cooperation.
The background color represents the environment, while a red
square means a cooperator occupy the lattice site. The empty sites
are occupied by defectors. (Top row) Dn = 0, a circular wave of
cooperative population propagates outward. (Middle row) Dn = 1,
a few small patches of cooperators move around and divide. (Bot-
tom row) Dn = ∞, a large cooperator cluster expand and shrink
over time with increasing amplitude until extinction.
work on controlling mean-field strategy-environment dy-
namics [21] to identify ways in which local manipulation
of resources, strategies, and/or perceptions can help sta-
bilize and conserve the commons.
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I. DERIVATION OF INDIVIDUAL GAME RULES RECOVERING REPLICATOR DYNAMICS
Here we derive the individual based game rules that are able to recover replicator dynamics
x′ = x (1− x) (rC(x, n)− rD(x, n)) , (S1)
in the continuous limit. The time is scaled by parameter  for more compact expression. The normalized time t will
be denoted as τ hereafter. We express the time derivation with respect to normalized time with the prime symbol.
We postulate that individuals undergo a birth-death process: a focal player that wins against its opponent in a game
can reproduce a new individual with the same strategy and replace (A) another random player in the system or (B)
the opponent. Here we show the derivation process of the scenario where a game involves three players (A), which
recapitulates the form of replicator dynamics first. The derivation following similar process but with only 2 individuals
involved in a game will be briefly introduced after derivation of (A) to show how it fails.
A. Individual-based rules involving 3 players in a game
We write the events in a chemical reaction form with reaction rates ki. The total number of players in the system
is constant as a result of the birth-death process, N = nC + nD, where nC and nD stand for number of cooperators
and defectors respectively. With C denoting a cooperator and D denoting a defector, the possible combinations of
players involved in a game are
focal︷︸︸︷
C +
opponent︷︸︸︷
C +
random
player︷︸︸︷
D
k1−→
focal︷︸︸︷
C +
opponent︷︸︸︷
C +
replaced︷︸︸︷
C
C + D + D
k2−→ C + D + C
D + C + C
k3−→ D + C + D
D + D + C
k4−→ D + D + D
(S2)
The transition rates of Eq. S2 are
T(nC + 1|nC) = k1 · nC ·
randomly choosing
an opponent C︷ ︸︸ ︷
nC − 1
N − 1 ·
a random D to
be replaced︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD
N − 1 +k2 · nC ·
randomly choosing
an opponent D︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD
N − 1 ·
a random D to
be replaced︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD
N − 1
T(nC − 1|nC) = k3 · nD ·
randomly choosing
an opponent C︷ ︸︸ ︷
nC
N − 1 ·
a random C to
be replaced︷ ︸︸ ︷
nC
N − 1 +k4 · nD ·
randomly choosing
an opponent D︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD − 1
N − 1 ·
a random C to
be replaced︷ ︸︸ ︷
nC
N − 1 .
(S3)
The terms in the above equations describe the change in number of two types of players in a probabilistic perspective:
there are nC (nD) cooperators (defectors) in the system, each of which has probability to pick another player, either
a cooperator (nC−1N−1 ) or a defector (
nD−1
N−1 ), as an opponent. At each time increment, the focal player can produce a
new individual with reaction rate ki∆τ . All players other than the focal player in the system has equal chance to be
replaced by the newborn individual. The individual to be replaced is a cooperator (defector) with probability Nc−1N−1
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2(ND−1N−1 ). Combining the transition probability of all the possible events listed above, the master equation that governs
the change in nC is accordingly
P (nC , τ + ∆τ) = P (nC , τ) + T(nC |nC − 1)P(nC − 1, τ)∆τ + T(nC |nC + 1)P(nC + 1, τ)∆τ
− T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC , τ)∆τ − T(nC − 1|nC)P(nC , τ)∆τ +O(∆τ2).
(S4)
Rearranging the master equation Eq. S4, dividing both side by ∆τ and taking ∆τ to be infinitesimal yields
P′ (nC , τ) = T(nC |nC − 1)P(nC − 1, τ) + T(nC |nC + 1)P(nC + 1, τ)
−T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC , τ)− T(nC − 1|nC)P(nC , τ). (S5)
To examine if the master equation derived from the individual-based events recovers replicator dynamics in the
continuous limit, we need to derive the time differential equation of the expected value of nC from the master
equation Eq. S5. To proceed, we denote the expected value of a variable with angular brackets. The definition of the
expected value of a random variable X is
〈X(τ)〉 =
∑
X
XP(X, τ). (S6)
Next, we multiply each term in the master equation Eq. S5 with nC and sum over all possible values of nC to obtain
the time differential equation describing the dynamics of 〈nC〉.
N∑
nC=0
nCP′ (nC) =
N∑
nC=1
nCT(nC |nC − 1)P(nC − 1) +
N−1∑
nC=0
nCT(nC |nC + 1)P(nC + 1)
−
N∑
nC=0
nCT(nC + 1|nC)P(nC)−
N∑
nC=0
nCT(nC − 1|nC)P(nC)
=
N∑
nC=0
(nC + 1)T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC) +
N∑
nC=0
(nC − 1)T(nC − 1|nC)P(nC)
−
N∑
nC=0
nCT(nC + 1|nC)P(nC)−
N∑
nC=0
nCT(nC − 1|nC)P(nC)
=
N∑
nC=0
T(nC + 1|nC)P(nC)−
N∑
nC=0
nCT(nC − 1|nC)P(nC).
(S7)
Plugging the expressions of transition rates in eq. Eq. S3 into the last equation Eq. S7 leads to
〈nC〉′ = 〈T (nC + 1|nC)〉 − 〈T (nC − 1|nC)〉
≈ k1 · 〈nC · nC
N
· nD
N
〉+ k2 · 〈nC · nD
N
· nD
N
〉 − k3 · 〈nD · nC
N
· nC
N
〉 − k4 · 〈nD · nC
N
· nD
N
〉. (S8)
when N,nC , nD >> 1. As stated earlier, N = nC +nD is a constant in the system. We then define x ≡ nCN , and thus
nD
N = 1− x. Dividing both sides of Eq. S8 by N , we find
〈x〉′ = k1 · 〈x2(1− x)〉+ k2 · 〈x(1− x)2〉 − k3 · 〈x2(1− x)〉 − k4 · 〈x(1− x)2〉. (S9)
For sufficiently large populations, fluctuations around the average value are expected to be sufficiently small, and
by ignoring correlatinos, we approximate the expected values with actual values and omit the angular brackets.
Rearranging Eq. S10 and omitting angular brackets, we get
x′ = x(1− x) [(k1x+ k2(1− x))− (k3x+ k4(1− x))] , (S10)
which recovers replicator dynamics with growth rates[
rC
rD
]
=
[
k1 k2
k3 k4
][
x
1− x
]
=
[
k1x+ k2(1− x)
k3x+ k4(1− x)
]
.
3Compared with Eq. 2 in the main text, it is apparent that the values of ki’s should be
k1 = R(n)
k2 = S(n)
k3 = T (n)
k4 = P (n)
.
which correspond to the payoffs of focal players.
B. Individual-based rules involving 2 players in a game
Interactions between individuals in a chemical equation form with reaction rates ki are
focal︷︸︸︷
C +
opponent︷︸︸︷
D
k′1−→
focal︷︸︸︷
C +
opponet
replaced︷︸︸︷
C
D + C
k′2−→ D + D
(S11)
Transition rates of Eq. S11 are
T(nC + 1|nC) = k′1 · nC ·
randomly choosing
an opponent C︷ ︸︸ ︷
nD
N − 1
T(nC − 1|nC) = k′2 · nD ·
randomly choosing
an opponent C︷ ︸︸ ︷
nC
N − 1 .
(S12)
Following the same derivation from Eq. S5 to Eq. S7 and plugging the expressions of transition rates in Eq. S12,
〈nC〉′ = 〈T (nC + 1|nC)〉 − 〈T (nC − 1|nC)〉
≈ k′1 · 〈nC ·
nD
N
〉 − k′2 · 〈nD ·
nC
N
〉, (S13)
when N,nC , cD >> 1. As before, N = nC + nD is a constant in the system. We define x ≡ nCN and thus nDN = 1− x.
Dividing both sides of Eq. S13 gives
〈x〉′ = k′1 · 〈x(1− x)〉 − k′2 · 〈x(1− x)〉. (S14)
For large populations, the fluctuations around expected values are negligible, and by assuming the absence of higher-
order correlation, we find
x = (k′1 − k′2)x(1− x). (S15)
This mean field dynamics in the IBM2 model is quadratic in x assuming ki’s do not dependent on information other
than payoffs, rather than being cubic in x as expected in the replicator dynamics for the IBM3 model.
II. SIMULATION DETAILS
A. Individual-based simulation
To simulate the coevolutionary dynamics in an individual-based, game-theoretic perspective, we adopt the
individual-based game rules derived in section I A. We simulate N games sequencially to allow equal chance of each
individual to be involved in a game within a time step ∆t. At the beginning of each time step, each player is labelled
by an integer ranging from 1 to N . 3 randomly permuted number series ranging from 1 to N are generated. The i−th
elements in the three random number series represent the index of the focal player, the opponent, the individual to be
4replaced in the i−th game respectively. A random number r ∈ [0, 1) is generated for each game, and the birth-death
process happens if r > ki∆τ = ki
∆t
 . ki is the reaction rate and depends on the strategies of the focal player and the
opponent. We complete a time step by updating environment n with Euler method,
∆n = n˙∆t = n(1− n)(θxnew(t)− (1− xnew(t)))∆t,
after N games. The subscript new denotes that the value of x in n˙ is taken to be the one after N games, rather than
the value at the beginning of the simulation time step. A simulation proceeds to the next time step after both x and
n are updated, and stops when total number of time steps reaches an assigned simulation horizon.
B. Spatially-explicit simulation
We perform spatially-explicit simulations on a 2D L× L lattice. Each lattice site can only be occupied by a single
player, either a cooperator or a defector. The rules for updating individual strategy in spatially-explicit simulations
are similar to that in non-spatial simulations. Instead of generating three random number series, only a randomly
permuted number series is generated to represent the index of the focal player in each game. The opponent player
and the individual to be replaced are then chosen in the von Neumann neighborhood of the focal player.
After N sequential games, the spatial profile of the environment is updated in two steps.
ni,j,s(t) =ni,j(t) + ni,j(t)(1− nij(t)) (θxi,j,new − (1− xi,j,new)) (S16a)
ni,j,f (t+ ∆t) =

Dn
∆t
∆x2 (ni−1,j,s(t)− 2ni,j,s(t) + ni+1,j,s(t)
+ni,j−1,s(t)− 2ni,j,s(t) + ni,j+1,new(t)) , for Dn = 0 or 1
Σi,jni,j,s(t)
L·L , for Dn =∞
. (S16b)
The first step (Eq. S16a) accounts for change in n due to individual strategies adopted in previous games in the same
time step. The second step accounts for diffusion was calculated with standard explicit forward-time centered-space
method (Eq. S16b). The subscripts i, j denote the value at coordinate (i, j). The subscript new in xnew again denotes
the updated quantity after N games. s in ni,j,s means the value of n is only affected by the individual strategies but
has not yet accounted for the effect of diffusion. f in ni,j,f indicates this is the final value for n after a time step
∆t. As before, a spatial simulation proceeds to the next simulation step after both x and n are updated and stops at
some pre-assigned simulation horizon.
C. Simulation parameters
We choose ∆x = 1 and ∆t = 0.05 to ensure the stability of 2D diffusion algorithm. Stability is ensured when
Dn
∆t
∆x2 ≤ 14 [S1]. We use periodic boundary conditions for spatial simulations. The scaling value  = 0.5 was further
chosen so that ∆τ = ∆t/ = 0.1. This assures the largest transition probability of a birth-death process ki∆τ will
be no larger than 1 given the values of payoff matrix chosen in all the simulations. The model parameters are in
arbitrary simulation units, and the values other than A0 are shown in Table S1.
The parameters of simulations in FIG. 1 are shown in Table S1 and FIG. S1. In FIG. 1, each plot for stochastic
individual-based model dynamics are averaged over 100 replicates except for oscillatory dynamics, given phase dif-
ferences that can arise due to demographic noise. The parameters except for Dn of simulations in FIG. 2 are shown
in Table S1 and FIG. S2. Dn is specified on each panel of FIG. 2 in the main text. The axes of heat maps ranging
from -2 to 2, linearly increase with difference 0.1 on both the horizontal axis, S0 − P0 and the vertical axis, R0 − T0.
There are thus 41 · 41 = 1681 grids on each heat map. The value of each grid on the heat maps is the average over
20 replicates, so there are information of 41 · 41 · 20 · 4 = 134480 simulations in FIG. 2. The parameters except for
Dn of simulations in FIG. 3 are shown in Table S1 and A0 =
[
2.5 5.5
1 6
]
. Dn is specified on each panel of FIG. 3 in the
main text.
5TABLE S1: Model parameter values in simulation units.
Variable Value
A1
[
3 0
5 1
]
A0 see below for each figure
N 10000
 0.5
θ 2
Dn [0, 1, ∞]
L 100
(x0, n0) (0.3, 0.7)
S0 ! P0 > 0S0 ! P0 < 0
R0 ! T0 > 0
R0 ! T0 < 0
slope = j3j
slope = j3j
slope = T1!R1P1!S1
h 5 5:5
6 6
i
h 1:5 5:5
1 6
i
h 2:5 5:5
1 6
ih 2:5 1:5
1 1
i
h 1:5 1:5
1 1
i
h 5:5 1:5
6 1
i
h 4:5 1:5
6 1
i
FIG. S1: The values of matrix A0 =
[
R0 S0
T0 P0
]
in each section on the parameter space of FIG. 1 in the main text.
S0 ! P0 > 0S0 ! P0 < 0
R0 ! T0 > 0
R0 ! T0 < 0
hR0 S0
1 1
i
R0 = 1:0 + 0:1m
S0 = 1:0 + 0:1m
m = fm 2 0 j m 5 20g
hR0 S0
1 6
i
R0 = 1:0 + 0:1m
S0 = 4:0 + 0:1m
m = fm 2 j m 5 20g
hR0 S0
6 6
i
R0 = 4:0 + 0:1m
S0 = 4:0 + 0:1m
m = fm 2 0 j m 5 20g
hR0 S0
6 1
i
R0 = 4:0 + 0:1m
S0 = 1:0 + 0:1m
m = fm 2 j m 5 20g
FIG. S2: The values of matrix A0 =
[
R0 S0
T0 P0
]
in each section on the parameter space of FIG. 2 in the main text.
6D. Classification Criteria for TOC and averted dynamics
The classification criteria for characterizing temporal dynamics beyond the transient phase of dynamics into TOC
or non-TOC is as follows:
• Find the difference between consecutive peaks and valleys in the environment, δn, and in the fraction of coop-
erators, δx.
– if the maximum δn or δx is larger than the threshold 1 − 2δ, it indicates the dynamics is an oscillating
TOC because of the large variation in magnitude. δ is a smaller number set to be 0.01.
– else, we take the mean of the later 20% time series of x(t) and n(t), i.e., x¯ and n¯ respectively. The
classification into a TOC is as follows:
∗ if n¯ < δ, it is a TOC.
∗ else, a TOC is averted.
To separate quasi-periodic dynamics from an oscillating TOC, we categorize a dynamics as an o-TOC if the am-
plitude is large enough (maximum δn > 1 − 2δ or δx > 1 − 2δ). This decision stump allows us to classify dynamics
with small to moderate oscillations as averted. After separating o-TOC from other oscillating dynamics, a trajectory
is classified as a TOC if the environment is drained at the later part of the simulation, namely n¯ < δ regardless what
the value of x¯ is.
III. SPATIAL-TEMPORAL DYNAMICS SIMULATION RESULTS
FIG. S3 shows how demographic noise in non-spatial individual based models (IBM) can change the system dy-
namics. The analysis of the ODE system (Eq. 2 and Eq. 3 in the main text) predicts neutral orbits when
(R0 − T0)/(S0 − P0) = θ (gray lines) [S2], but the non-spatial IBM simulations reveal that the perfect orbits are
impossible due to stochasticity. We can see in FIG. S3 that demographic noise modulates the amplitudes of oscil-
lations substantially. The increased amplitudes can drive the system toward a boundary and may even lead to a
TOC (FIG. S3(b)). Oscillations may also be induced by strong coupling between local sites mediated by diffusing
environment. As shown in FIG. S4, oscillations are present across a large range of the (S0−P0)− (R0−T0) parameter
space. Some of the oscillations may lead to a TOC (FIG. S4(a)), while others may have various amplitudes but the
population persists over multiple runs, in these cases until the end of the simulation (FIG. S4(b) - FIG. S4(d)). Given
the absorbing conditions of the stochastic model, we cannot guarantee infinite-time persistence of oscillations in any
finite simulation.
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FIG. S3: Demographic noise can alter the dynamical behaviors of the coevolutionary system. (a) Persistent
oscillations with varying amplitudes with IBM (black lines), (b) If the amplitude of oscillations grows larger, it is
possible for the system to approach one of the absorbing states (x, n) = (0, 0), (0, 1), (1, 0), (1, 1). The values of A0
in this Figure are
[
2 1.5
1 1
]
.
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FIG. S4: The oscillating dynamics are common with Dn =∞ in a wide range of A0. These four plots shows the
temporal dynamics of a replicate with a specific A0, and where it falls on the (S0 − P0)− (R0 − T0) parameter space
in the each inserted plot. The values of A0’s are (a)
[
2.5 5.5
1 6
]
, (b)
[
2.5 1.5
1 1
]
, (c)
[
1.5 1.5
1 1
]
, and (d)
[
5.5 2
6 1
]
, respectively.
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